Talisman Gate

Friday, December 22, 2006

Standoff in Beirut

December 22, 2006 Edition > Section: Opinion >

Standoff in Beirut

BY NIBRAS KAZIMI

December 22, 2006
URL: http://www.nysun.com/article/45609

What happens when you couple a Mexican standoff with a game of Russian roulette? You get Lebanese politics over the last several weeks: The revolvers are out, the politicians keep pulling at the trigger, and luckily, so far, no bullets have been chambered.

There are two groups in this standoff. They are polarizing Lebanese society based on sectarian identity and accusing one another of serving foreign interests. On the one hand, there is the opposition that consists of a near-monolith Shiite community led by Hezbollah, allied to half the Maronites under General Michel Aoun and a smattering of Sunnis, Druze, and Greek Orthodox. This group is accused of being agents of Syria and Iran. On the other hand, there is the March 14 coalition, named after the date of mass protests in 2005 that precipitated Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon. It consists of a near-monolith Sunni community led by the Hariri family, the other half of the Maronites, the vast majority of the Druze and Greek Orthodox, and Lebanon's few liberal democrats. This group is accused of being lackeys for America and Saudi Arabia. More or less, the country is torn in half between the two groups.

For the past three weeks, the opposition has been besieging the Cabinet led by the March 14 coalition. Each is angling for total victory. For the opposition that would mean controlling the parliament through new elections, holding veto power over Cabinet decisions, choosing the next president of the country, and safeguarding the Syrian regime. For the March 14 coalition, total victory translates into controlling the Cabinet and the presidency, disarming Hezbollah, and setting off a cascade of events that eventually leads to the overthrow of the Assad dynasty in Syria.

Lebanon functions according to an unwritten sectarian formula, whereby the three main component groups of the country — Sunnis, Shiites, and Maronites — need to be content with their share of the pie in order for civil peace to prevail. Total victory for the opposition would mean eviscerating the Sunnis and half the Maronites, while total victory for the March 14 group would demean the Shiites and the other half of the Maronites — hardly a recipe for peace.

How did Lebanon get to this point where one false move, say a Sunni suicide bomber detonating himself among Shiite crowds, could trigger a return to civil war? The answer can be traced to a tight-lipped Belgian man called Serge Brammertz. He was appointed by the United Nations as the lead investigator into the assassination of the former prime minister, Rafik Hariri, who was killed in a car bombing almost two years ago. Mr. Brammertz has been handing in straightforward progress reports that haven't indicated any suspects. His latest, released last week, finally settled the matter of who perpetrated the crime: a suicide bomber who likely knew that the target was Hariri and who most probably detonated the bomb himself. Although he is carefully piecing together DNA and other evidence, Mr. Brammertz has still not named this suicide bomber. But the implication is that the bomber was a jihadist.

In six months, Mr. Brammertz is supposed to hand in his final report. This time it won't be a sterile progress report but rather an indictment. The indictment will mark who wins and loses in the game of Lebanese politics — the opposition or March 14. The rosiest scenario for the opposition is that Mr. Brammertz points a finger at a shadowy Sunni jihadist organization that may or may not have had a state sponsor like Syria. In this scenario, Mr. Brammertz would find it hard to pin the shadowy mechanisms of manipulating these jihadists on the Syrian regime. The best-case scenario for March 14 would be a direct indictment of the top Syrian leadership resulting in international sanctions and accelerated efforts to spark an uprising against the Alawite minority now in power in Damascus.

A meddlesome Syria is a geographical and historical fact of life for Lebanon. If Syria is off the hook, then the internal political scales in Lebanon would tip in favor of the opposition, while if the Syrian regime is cornered, then March 14 can force its rivals to concede political ground.

Both the opposition and March 14 are assuming that, in lieu of a smoking gun, Mr. Brammetz would only be able to present circumstantial evidence showing that the Syrians meant Hariri and other recent victims of assassinations harm. The international tribunal that would be set up to judge such circumstantial evidence would need to decide whether there was Syrian culpability and if so, how far up the chain of command it reached. Such a decision will be limited or augmented by the legal charter setting the scope of the international tribunal. The opposition and March 14 are now bickering over who gets to author this charter, in other words, who gets to decide whether the tribunal will have any teeth or not.

The standoff can end either in a political settlement or violence. A political settlement is the most likely temporary palliative that the feuding parties will opt for in order to avoid violence. The opposition wants to weaken the charter of the tribunal. First they want an independent body of six experts to review it, probably rendering it innocuous. Then they want veto power in the Cabinet that would decide on it. And then they want the charter to go to the president, who is allied with the opposition, before it goes to the parliament, controlled by March 14. If these demands are not met, then the opposition will allow the standoff to continue while demanding a new electoral law and early elections that they believe will give them a majority in parliament. A political settlement would not give the opposition total victory, but it would reset the situation in its favor.

The March 14 coalition is hoping to hold on to its gains — controlling the parliament, the Cabinet, and a finished charter that has already been voted on by the Cabinet and sent to the United Nations — and it hopes to do so with international support and cover. Yet this position may fall apart if a country like Russia uses its Security Council prerogatives to stall formation of the international tribunal until the standoff in Lebanon is resolved, or until the Syrians, who are chummy with President Putin, give the thumbs up.

I would like to see Hezbollah disarmed, and I would like the Syrian people to live under a democratically elected government — goals shared with the March 14 coalition. But I ask myself, at what price in Lebanese blood is this feasible? The Syrian regime and Hezbollah manipulated sectarian tensions and local Lebanese politics and have maneuvered the opposition well, and they stand to fare better with a political settlement than the March 14 coalition. The Americans are telling the latter to hang in there and keep up its defiance, but America doesn't have a coherent policy to go after Hezbollah or to overthrow the Syrian regime.

A false move in Beirut may result in a bloodbath. Who will take responsibility for that? Someone needs to counsel March 14 to stand down for the time being, or at least until Washington gets its muddled policy sorted out.

Mr. Kazimi can be reached at nibraska@yahoo.com

December 22, 2006 Edition > Section: Opinion >

Wednesday, December 06, 2006

Cognitive Dissonance on Iraq

December 6, 2006 Edition > Section: Opinion >

Cognitive Dissonance on Iraq

BY NIBRAS KAZIMI

December 6, 2006
URL: http://www.nysun.com/article/44701

The Iraq Study Group report is due out today, serving to focus minds and sharpen talking points about what to do in Iraq. And yet, for all the time spent talking about this urgent matter, and with all the political and security ramifications at stake, the level of the debate has been intellectually mediocre and muddled with hysterics.

Many commentators are herding into three "exit plan" categories: (1) the counterinsurgency cannot win militarily and we must grant political concessions to the insurgents, (2) America cannot afford to be embroiled in a sectarian civil war with regional implications, and (3) even if there were a chance for victory, the long-term effect would damage America's soul.

The last group — that argues an American win would be a Pyrrhic victory — belongs to a subgenre of leftist politics that has consistently maintained that using American might is wrong. This group should be ignored outright. The term is borrowed from classical times when King Pyrrhus won a victory over the Romans, but this win was devastating to the victor. The reasoning is that the cost of winning is so high that it would have been better not to enter a war in the first place. Those making this argument seize upon the numbers of American and Iraqi casualties and brandish that national pain against wartime leaders, disregarding the leaders' original intent in fighting the enemy. "Why should soldiers die in lieu of generals?" they ask, forgetting that there is an enemy intent on killing. Gullible, they are susceptible to bogus and manipulated reports of civilian casualties. The cynics among them would peg Saddam Hussein as the lesser evil to a chaotic Iraq.

Then there are those who are eager to declare that Iraq has entered its civil war phase. This intellectual stampede began when Senator Warner suggested that America's involvement in tamping down the flames of a sectarian conflict would require a renewed — and impossible to get — congressional mandate. The cynics wanted to call what is happening in Iraq a "civil war" in order to put Mr. Warner's threat of an immediate pullback into play.

Civil war experts, who know little about Iraq's history and society, suddenly appeared to claim the press's attention, with some presumably eyeing book deals down the road. Such is the market quality of intellectualism. Others, influenced by the "Pyrrhic victory" crowd, tend to see the trees for the forest: the number of bodies piling up at Baghdad's morgue. But in the cycle of sectarian-driven killings and reprisals, one often forgets that the number of killers has not dramatically increased. Rather, the killers are simply killing more people to leave an impression of burgeoning sectarian strife.

The most rational camp arguing for quitting Iraq comprises those who believe that a military win is impossible. But assuming that America can't win and is therefore losing, then who among its jihadist and Baathist enemies can claim victory on the ground? The answer is that no one can demonstrate that the insurgents are on the upswing. Insurgent activity may have increased, but its overall results, such as holding down territory, are meager. To further understand this disconnect between one side losing and the opposite side not winning, we need to take a fresh look at the insurgency — the original problem so often forgotten — and the flawed counterinsurgency effort that was supposed to quell it.

Let us start by asking: Have we done all that is operationally possible to win? The insurgents have made use of advances in technology to operate nimbly and propagate loudly, but has America's technological superiority been leveraged against them?

The blunt answer is no, and the reason is incompetence — by both the Iraqi and American sides. Is it possible that vehicles in Iraq are not properly registered even after the recurring car bomb nightmare over the last three and a half years? We still don't know which car belongs to whom. Permanent and advanced license plates with bar codes for easy scanning would streamline the work of roadblocks and provide the first lead after a car bombing.

Here are a couple more ideas where improvements can be made:

(1) Punish the insurgents more severely. Presently, there are few punitive measures taken against insurgents and their families. The authorities could impose financial penalties to offset the damage that insurgents inflict on other Iraqis. Once an insurgent is killed or arrested and then charged, authorities could, for example, freeze his assets and sell them at auction. The proceeds could go to a terror victims' fund or to the state treasury to compensate for the losses sustained by public property and services. Furthermore, family members, including women, should be treated as accomplices if they fail to report blatant criminal activity such as the use of homes as bomb-making factories or as detention cells holding abductees. Such arrests of women could be undertaken by the Iraqi police to avoid the stigma that "foreigners are touching up our women." Iraqi law already stipulates that accomplices should be held responsible. The financial and familial price for choosing to be an insurgent must get steeper. The existing consequences are too mild even by Western standards.

(2) Install GPS devices on police and government vehicles. Death squads almost invariably use police cars or government vehicles in carrying out false arrests and abductions. There is a unit selling in America for $600 that pinpoints stolen cars. Why can't we put this device inside every single police and government car? The next time Sunni residents report that policemen have abducted their young men, data can be pulled up to show what police cars were operating in that neighborhood and at that time. If these devices are tampered with or disabled, then this would also become apparent when the data goes off the network. Cars may also have fake police markings, but these can be distinguished from real police cars at checkpoints: If a police car doesn't have a GPS device, then it's a fraud.

There are tens of good ideas out there for winning this war that have not been implemented and have not been debated beyond wonky military journals. It's not the number of American or Iraqi boots on the ground that matters in winning this war but rather the number of microchips used to map out and combat the insurgency. Running patrols and shooting straight is only part of what is necessary in such a modern war. Americans and Iraqis must adapt their strategies to fit the battle before they can win the battle. This hasn't been done in earnest yet, and we need to ask "why?" rather than scream "flee, flee, the sky is falling" in panic.

Mr. Kazimi can be reached at nibraska@yahoo.com. For more counterinsurgency suggestions visit his blog at talismangate. blogspot.com

December 6, 2006 Edition > Section: Opinion >